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THE ALLOCATION OF PERCOLATING WATER
UNDER THE OKLAHOMA GROUND WATER
LAW OF 1972*
Eric B. Jensen**
On December 12, 1978, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board is-
sued its "Final Order for Determination of the Maximum Annual
Yield of Fresh Ground Water from the Tillman County, Oklahoma
Alluvium and Terrace Basin."' Although the law which authorized the
issuance of the order was approved by the legislature in 19722 and be-
came effective on July 1, 1973,1 the order was not issued until five years
later. This order signaled the completion of work required under the
new law before regular administration could proceed for the first
ground water basin in the state.4 Thus, administration of ground water
under the Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1972 is in a transitional
* This article is a substantially revised and expanded version of a paper presented to the
Arizona Groundwater Management Study Commission in Tucson, Arizona, February 25, 1978.
The author expresses special appreciation to the staff of the Oklahoma Water Resources Board for
their cooperation in providing information and answering questions in connection with this arti-
cle. The conclusions expressed herein are those of the author, who assumes responsibility for their
accuracy.
** Assistant Professor of Law and Assistant Dean of the College of Law, The University of
Tulsa. A.B., University of California, Berkeley; J.D., Harvard University. Member of the
Oklahoma and California Bars.
I. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL ORDER FOR DETERMINATION OF THE
MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD OF FRESH GROUND WATER FROM THE TILLMAN COUNTY, OK-
LAHOMA, ALLUVIUM AND TERRACE BASIN (Dec. 12, 1978).
2. Act of April 7, 1972, ch. 248, §§ 1-24, 1972 Okla. Sess. Laws (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
82 §§ 1020.1-.22 (Supp. 1978)).
3. Act of April 7, 1972, ch. 248, § 24, 1972 Okla. Sess. Laws 534.
4. Conversations with James Barnett, acting Executive Director, and J.A. Wood, Chief,
Groundwater Division, Oklahoma Water Resources Board, Feb. 16, 1978, at the office of the
Board in Oklahoma City.
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phase.5 Several questions of interpretation remain unanswered and
several problems of administration remain unsolved.
In order to understand the Ground Water Law of 1972, the com-
mon law treatment of property interests in ground water and an earlier
regulatory scheme adopted in Oklahoma must both be considered. Al-
though the historical development of Oklahoma ground water law has
been treated elsewhere,6 this article will re-examine that history to de-
scribe how it has influenced some of the problems of the present.
Before considering Oklahoma ground water law from a historical per-
spective, however, it is first necessary to understand the basic structure
of Oklahoma water law in general.
I. INTRODUCTION: SOME IMPORTANT DISTINCTIONS IN OKLAHOMA
WATER LAW
Two important distinctions should be observed while analyzing
Oklahoma water law. The first distinction is between property interests
in water and regulation of water use. The second distinction is between
stream water and other kinds of water, including percolating ground
water.
5. However, the Oklahoma Water Resources Board is working rapidly to establish regular
administration of the new ground water law in western Oklahoma. The following final orders
have been issued by the Oklahoma Water Resources Board: FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR
GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN TILLMAN TERRACE AND ALLUVIAL BASIN, TILLMAN COUNTY,
OKLAHOMA (Feb. 14, 1978); FINAL ORDER FOR DETERMINATION OF THE MAXIMUM ANNUAL
YIELDS OF FRESH GROUND WATER FROM THE TILLMAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, ALLUVIUM AND
TERRACE BASIN (Dec. 12, 1978); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS
IN TEXAs COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Dec. 12, 1978); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND
WATER RIGHTS IN CIMARRON COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Jan. 9, 1979); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING
PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (March 13, 1979); FINAL
ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN KIOWA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (March
13, 1979). In addition, the final order determining prior rights for Beaver County, Oklahoma, is to
be presented to the Oklahoma Water Resources Board on April 10, 1979. Letter from J.A. Wood,
responding to letter from this author dated March 13, 1979. Preliminary work is being done in
twelve other counties in western and central Oklahoma, including Oklahoma and Cleveland
counties, and in a portion of Tillman county not covered by the existing final orders. OKLAHOMA
WATER RESOURCES BOARD, MONTHLY PROGRESS REPORT FOR DETERMINATION OF PRIOR
RIGHTS, MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD, EQUAL PROPORTIONATE SHARES, AND ALLOCATION OF
GROUND WATER UNDER NEW LAW (1979).
6. Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Ground or Percolating Water in the Pre-1971 period, 24
OKLA. L. REV. 403 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rarick IV]. This article is the fourth of an incom-
plete series of articlesby Professor Rarick on Oklahoma water law. Because of Professor Rarick's
close association with recent developments in the law, the series provides valuable insights into the
political process leading to the existing law. The other articles in the series are: Rarick, Oklahoma
Water Law, Stream and Surface in the Pre-1963 Period, 22 OKLA. L. REV. i (1969) [hereinafter
cited as Rarick I]; Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law, Stream and Surface Under the 1963 Amend-
ments, 23 OKLA. L. REV. 19 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Rarick II]; Rarick, Oklahoma Water Law,
Stream and Surface, The Water Conseriation Storage Commission and the 1965 and 1967 Amend-
ments, 24 OKLA. L. REV. 1 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rarick III].
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The distinction between property interests in water and regulation
of water use may be regarded as artificial. Indeed, in the case of
ground water, where the water has no value apart from the use which
might be made of it7 and where it is physically impractical to exclude
others from access to the water in place which one might theoretically
own, 8 the only meaningful limitations on a property interest are those
which limit the right to use water or to interfere with another person's
use. Thus, the function of the property concept and the function of
regulating use are identical in a practical sense. Nevertheless, the dis-
tinction provides a useful analytical tool for determining the limits on
the objectives of the regulatory statutes and the means employed to
attain those objectives.9
The distinction between stream water and other kinds of water
may likewise be regarded as artificial. Modem hydrogeology considers
ground water and surface water to be interrelated so that the use made
of one resource necessarily affects the other.'" Further, it is advanta-
geous from a management perspective to treat ground water and sur-
face water as fungible. I  Nevertheless, Oklahoma law continues to
treat ground water and surface water separately.
A. Property Interests and Regulation of Use
The conceptual distinction between property interests in water and
the regulation of water use is suggested by the organization of the
Oklahoma Statutes. The Oklahoma Legislature chose to include the
statute which defines property interests in water in title 60 of the
Oklahoma Statutes 12 along with statutes defining other kinds of prop-
erty interests,' 3 whereas the statutes regulating the use of water are all
found in title 82.' 4 The distinction has also been implicitly recognized
in case law.'5
7. It is more difficult to conclude that the water from surface streams has no value apart
from use, at least insofar as use means extraction, since flowing surface water has environmental
and aesthetic value in place. In fact, the statement in the text may be an oversimplification as
applied to groundwater since groundwater in place may have value as subjacent support for the
surface.
8. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971).
9. Further, the distinction is suggested by the constitutional analysis of oil and gas regula-
tions, which present problems similar to those encountered in ground water law See, e.g.,
Champlin Refining Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932); Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana
(No. 1), 177 U.S. 190 (1900).
10. C. CORKER, GROUND WATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 49-51 (1971).
11. Id at xxiv - xxvi.
12. Rarick II, supra note 6, at 22-23.
13. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971).
14. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.1-.32, 1020.1-.22 (Supp. 1978).
15. See notes 102-03 infra and accompanying text.
1979]
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The distinction has not always been observed, however. For ex-
ample, in a recent case whose resolution depended upon whether the
statutes regulating stream water use or the statutes regulating ground
water use applied to the water source in question, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court answered the question by focusing almost exclusively
on the statute governing property interests, referring only incidentally
to the regulatory statutes themselves.16 Similarly, administrative con-
fusion of the two concepts is indicated by the use of the term "vested
rights" in the ground water regulations as originally adopted under the
1972 law.'7 The Oklahoma Water Resources Board has since recog-
nized the distinction by changing the term "vested rights" to "prior
rights,"'" thus removing the property interest connotation from the reg-
ulations.
B. Stream Water and Other Kinds of Water
It is somewhat of an oversimplification to say that Oklahoma law
differentiates stream water from other kinds of water. The precise con-
tours of the distinction may differ according to the purpose for which
such a distinction becomes necessary. If property interests are being
defined, one distinction applies. If the use of water is being regulated,
another similar, but perhaps slightly different distinction applies. In a
small number of cases, the failure of the distinctions to correspond ex-
actly raises some potential difficulties. 9
1. Property Interests
In defining property interests, the relevant distinction is between
"water standing [on land], or flowing over or under its surface but not
forming a definite stream" and "[w]ater running in a definite stream,
16. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd. v. City of Lawton, 580 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1978). A partial
justification for the court's using the property statute rather than the regulatory statutes for resolv-
ing the issue is that the statutes regulating stream water use contain no clear internal reference to
their own scope, while the property statute states, "Water running in a definite stream . . . be-
comes public water and is subject to appropriation. . . as provided by law." OKLA. STAT. tit. 60,
§ 60 (1971). See notes 56-64 infra and accompanying text. Thus, the property statute might prop-
erly be regarded as the statute defining the scope of the statutes regulating stream water use. See
also, Rarick II, supra note 6. However, the ground water law does contain a clear internal refer-
ence to its scope, which the court fails to cite. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.1(A), 1020.2, 1020.7
(Supp. 1978).
17. Okla. Water Resources Board Reg. §§ 600.1(d), 670.1-.14 (1973) (amended, Dec. 14,
1976).
18. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, AMENDMENT TO THE OKLAHOMA WATER RE-
SOURCES BOARD RULES AND REGULATIONS, CH. Vi, TAKING AND USE OF GROUNDWATER (Dec.
14, 1976).
19. See note 65 infra and accompanying text.
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formed by nature over or under the surface ... ."I' Water in the for-
mer category belongs to the owner of the land upon or beneath which it
is found.2 Water in the latter category may be used by a landowner
for domestic purposes,22 but it is public water subject to appropriation
under the law.23
To define the distinction as being one between water found on the
surface and water found beneath the surface is imprecise. Some water
found on the surface-standing water and flowing (diffused)
water-belongs to the owner of the surface, and some underground
water-that running in a natural stream-is public water, which a
landowner may take for domestic use, but which is otherwise subject to
the law governing the appropriation of water. In Canada v. City of
Shawnee,24 the Oklahoma Supreme Court translated the statutory cate-
gories as they apply to subsurface water into a distinction between per-
colating water and underground streams. The court stated:
In legal consideration, subterranean waters are divided
into two classes: (1) percolating waters, and (2) underground
streams. Percolating waters are those which seep, ooze, filter,
and otherwise circulate through the subsurface strata without
definite channels. Underground streams are simply what
their name implies; water passing through the ground beneath
the surface in defined channels.25
As thus defined, the category "underground streams" may be either a
very small category or a very large one, depending upon whether one
considers that definition to require that there be a turbulent flow such
as characterizes surface streams or only a requirement that there be
confining strata.26 The Canada court, however, envisioned a narrower
category than that which would be created if the only requirement was
confining strata. The court adopts the generally accepted presumption
that subterranean waters are percolating waters,27 which indicates that
20. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971).
21. Id
22. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.1(B) (Supp. 1978).
23. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971).
24. 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937).
25. Id at 54, 64 P.2d at 696. In the portion of the opinion from which the quotation is taken,
the court does not specifically refer to the statutory categories. Later in the opinion, however, the
court discusses the relationship between the statutory concept of ownership and the American rule
of reasonable use which it adopts for percolating water. See notes 74-76 infra and accompanying
text.
26. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 24-25, n.52 (R. Clark ed. 1967). Cf. C. CORKER,
GROUNDWATER LAW, MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 147 (1971).
27. 179 Okla. at 54, 64 P.2d at 696. See I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 322-23 (R. Clark ed.
1979]
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the court must have believed that more underground water fit its defini-
tion of "percolating water" than fit its definition of "underground
streams."28
The Canada court's discussion of the classification of subsurface
water must be regarded as dictum since the issue of classification was
not raised by the parties. 9 No Oklahoma appellate cases involving
subsurface water have been reported where the contention is made that
the water source is an underground stream. The category of under-
ground streams (iLe., subsurface waters which are nevertheless public),
however, may include more than gushing underground streams.
In Oklahoma Water Resources Board v. City of Lawton,3" the
Board had granted a permit under the ground water law to withdraw
ground water which supplied a spring. The city claimed that the Board
should have proceeded under the stream water law, which would have
required the Board to consider the city's asserted prior right to the
water. In holding that the spring supplied a definite stream and that
the water should have been classified as stream water, rather than as
ground water, the court found that the legislature had intended to for-
bid landowners from preventing the flow of natural springs which sup-
ply a definite stream.3" The court did not consider that the water was
captured before it emerged on the surface, but rather it assumed that,
since the resource tapped was the source of a spring, it was subject to
stream water rules regardless of whether or not the water was captured
on the surface.
The court focused on the fact that the water from the spring flowed
for a short distance as diffused water after it reached the surface before
it entered a definite stream and held this to be immaterial. Thus, it
would appear that the waters of a definite stream are not limited to the
waters within its banks. This fact, combined with the above-noted fact
that the water in Lawton had been captured beneath the surface, sug-
gests that subsurface water may be part of a definite surface stream.
Some earlier Oklahoma cases provide analogies leading to the
1967). In terms of the statute, the distinction should be restated as a presumption that subterra-
nean water is not part of a definite stream.
28. Further, the court's physical description of percolating water includes a reference to im-
permeable strata which cause accumulations of percolating water in great abundance. 179 Okla.
at 53, 64 P.2d at 696.
29. Id. at 54, 64 P.2d at 696.
30. 580 P.2d 510 (Okla. 1978).
31. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971).
[Vol. 14:437
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same conclusion. In two such cases,3 2 the issue was whether there was
a privilege to erect barriers against flood waters and cause the water to
flood other land. If the water was part of a definite stream, there was
no such privilege. If it was merely surface water, however, there was
such a privilege under the common enemy doctrine.33 In both cases,
the court found that the waters were part of a definite stream, even
though they were found outside the banks of the stream:
Overflow waters that continue in a general course, although
without defined banks, back into the water course from which
they started, or into another water course, do not become
"surface waters," but remain a part of the water course.3 4
The only limitation on this principle is that the overflow waters must be
the result of reasonably foreseeable stream conditions, or, to use the
words of the cases, "ordinary floods."35
Although Lawton is limited to holding that ground water supply-
ing a spring should be considered stream water rather than ground
water, the earlier cases suggest that any ground water whose occurrence
is closely connected with the ordinary flow of a surface stream should
be treated as stream water.36 The distinction between diffused surface
water and surface water in a stream is analogous to the distinction be-
tween underground water not part of a stream and underground water
part of a stream, and aptly so since the property statute draws no dis-
tinction between surface water and subsurface water, but only a distinc-
tion between stream water and water not part of a stream.37 The
conclusion suggested by the cases is further borne out by a provision of
the Oklahoma stream water law that authorizes a riparian owner to
take stream water for domestic use from wells on his premises. 38 This
statutory provision would make little sense if underground water
closely associated with a stream was not considered to be stream water.
32. Franks v. Rouse, 192 Okla. 520, 137 P.2d 899 (1943); Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla.
684, 102 P. 79 (1909).
33. See Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla. 684, 688, 102 P. 79, 80-81 (1909).
34. Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla. 684, 102 Pac. 79 (1909) (syllabus of the court);
Franks v. Rouse, 192 Okla. 520, 524, 137 P.2d 899, 902 (1943) (quoting Town of Jefferson v.
Hicks).
35. Town of Jefferson v. Hicks, 23 Okla. 684, 687, 102 Pac. 79, 80 (1909). Seealso Franks v.
Rouse, 192 Okla. 520, 524-25, 137 P.2d 899, 903 (1943) (quoting Town of Jefferson v. Hicks).
36. Professor Rarick has apparently drawn the same conclusion, although his terminology is
that of percolating water versus underground streams. He concludes that water moving in the
alluvium along surface streams is properly classified as water of an underground stream. Rarick
IV, supra note 6, at 424.
37. See notes 23-29 supra and accompanying text.
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.2(A) (Supp. 1978).
1979]
7
Jensen: The Allocation of Percolating Water under the Oklahoma Ground Wat
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1978
TULSA LAW JOURNAL
This conclusion must be qualified by posing a question implicitly
raised, but not explicitly addressed, in Lawton. As noted earlier,39 the
Lawton court used the property statute to answer a question concern-
ing the scope of the regulatory statutes. Apparently, the Lawton court
considered the property statute to have an important bearing upon the
scope of the stream water regulation but did not consider the statutes
which precisely define the scope of the ground water regulations. As
will be discussed below, 40 the scope of the ground water regulations is
broader in some ways than the classification of ground water not in a
definite stream that was suggested by the foregoing case analysis.
Thus, the question raised is whether the statute defining the scope of
the ground water regulations has the unstated effect of narrowing the
definition of stream water for the purposes of defining property inter-
ests.41
2. Regulation of the Use of Water
Oklahoma has two different administrative schemes for regulating
the use of water. The regulation of stream water is based on prior ap-
propriation.42 For ground water, as will be discussed below,43 regula-
tion follows the concept of correlative rights by apportioning water to
landowners in proportion to their ownership of the surface of the land.
To make the distinction in terms of ground water versus stream water,
however, is an oversimplification.
The Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1972 defines ground water
as "water under the surface of the earth regardless of the geologic struc-
ture in which it is standing or moving outside the cut bank of any defi-
nite stream."'  Other provisions of the ground water law45 employ the
term "ground water" so that the scope of each provision is limited in its
effect to water fitting the description contained in the definition.46 Two
39. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
40. See notes 51-55 infra and accompanying text.
41. See note 64 infra and accompanying text. Professor Rarick assumes that changes in the
scope of the groundwater regulations have the effect of broadening or narrowing the definition of
water not in a definite stream. See Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 424. If, indeed, the ground water
law regulates some ground water which is part of a definite stream, then the ground water law has
effectively converted to private use some property which the statute declares to be public property.
See OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971). One may well wonder whether committing public property
to private use in this way is a proper exercise of governmental power.
42. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.2(B), 105.12 (Supp. 1978).
43. See notes 131 & 164 infra and accompanying text.
44. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.1(A) (Supp. 1978).
45. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.1-.22 (Supp. 1978).
46. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.7 (Supp. 1978).
[Vol. 14:437
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other limitations on the scope of the ground water law appear in the
law itself. The first is a provision which excludes from coverage "the
taking, using or disposal of salt water [defined as water containing
5,000 parts per million or more total dissolved solids4 7 ] associated with
the exploration, production or recovery of oil and gas or to the taking,
using or disposal of water trapped in producing mines."4 8 The second
include several provisions which expressly apply to "fresh ground
water" or "fresh ground water basins,"4 9 fresh water being defined as
water containing less than 5,000 parts per million of dissolved solids.5 0
The definition of ground water used in ground water regulation
differs from the concept of subsurface water not part of a definite
stream used for defining property interests. The statutory declaration
that the geologic structure in which the water stands or moves is irrele-
vant,51 combined with the statute's exclusion of water found within the
cut bank or any stream,5" both excludes some subsurface water not part
of a definite stream and includes some subsurface water which is part
of a definite stream. 3 For example, fresh water found in deep strata
separated by impermeable material from a surface stream-so that it is
not part of the surface stream-is nevertheless beyond the scope of the
ground water law if it is found within the cut bank of the overlying
surface stream. 4 On the other hand, water flowing in the alluvium
47. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.1(G) (Supp. 1978).
48. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.2 (Supp. 1978).
49. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.4, 1020.15 (Supp. 1978).
50. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.1(G) (Supp. 1978).
51. Geologic structure is irrelevant only for the purpose of defining ground water. The defi-
nition of ground water basin includes consideration of the geologic structure as perhaps its con-
trolling feature. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.1(C)-.1(D) (Supp. 1978).
52. The absence of commas in the statute makes it ambiguous. The reading in the text as-
sumes that it would be correct to punctuate the statute as "water under the surface of the earth[,]
regardless of the geologic structure in which it is standing or moving[,] outside the cut bank of any
definite stream." OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.1(A) (Supp. 1978). The alternative reading would be
to include all subsurface water, considering irrelevant the geologic structure outside the cut bank
in which the water stands or moves. The punctuated reading is considered appropriate on the
basis of a discussion with Mr. J.A. Wood, Chief of Groundwater Division, Oklahoma Water Re-
sources Board, which occurred February 16, 1978. This discussion suggested that the "cut bank"
limitation is for administrative convenience in establishing the applicability of the law, as it is
considerably easier to observe from where the surface groundwater is taken than to determine
whether the subsurface source is closely connected with the surface stream.
53. Unless the statutes defining the scope of the ground water law have the effect of narrow-
ing the definition of "definite stream." See note 41 supra and accompanying text and notes 64-65
infra and accompanying text.
54. See note 52 supra. The alternative reading of the statute would eliminate this difference
since, although the geologic structure outside the cut bank would be irrelevant under the statute,
the geologic structure within the cut bank would be relevant to determine whether the subsurface
water was part of the stream or not.
9
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along a surface stream but outside the cut bank of the stream-water
which is arguably part of the stream 55 -is within the coverage of the
ground water law.
The scope of the Oklahoma stream water law5 6 seems to be con-
trolled by the statutory definition of "definite stream." The stream
water law does not, however, employ its critical term of art as consist-
ently as does the ground water law.17 In fact, the only use of the term
"definite stream" is to exclude from the coverage of the act farm ponds
and gully plugs not located on definite streams.58 Repeated references
to "streams" and "stream systems" can be found throughout the act,5 9
however, including a provision which awkwardly states the principle
that the right to use the water of a stream may be claimed only as estab-
lished under the stream water law or under the property provision.60
To say that the statutory definition of "definite stream" controls
the scope of the stream water law does not describe the water which is
subject to the law very precisely. The statute uses such terms as "water
from a stream,"'6' "water of a stream ' 62 and "stream system" 63 without
stating whether or not these terms refer only to the water found within
the bed and banks which define a definite stream and without other-
wise carefully defining a category of water. Thus, the statutory concept
of stream water is subject to the same broad interpretation as is the
corresponding concept used to define property interests. 64
The Lawton case, of course, may stand for the proposition that the
property concept is identical to the regulatory concept, since the court
employed the property interest statute to determine the scope of the
stream water regulatory statute. But the two concepts cannot be identi-
cal unless the property interest concept of "stream water" is narrowly
defined to exclude any subsurface water found outside the cut bank of
a stream or unless the statutory definition of ground water is judicially
narrowed to exclude water which is part of a definite stream. Other-
wise, the inconsistent systems of regulation embodied in the stream
55. See note 53 supra.
56. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.1-.32 (Supp. 1978).
57. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
58. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.2(A) (Supp. 1978).
59. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.5, 105.7, 105.29 (Supp. 1978).
60. OKLa. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.5 (Supp. 1978).
61. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.5, 105.7 (Supp. 1978).
62. E.g., id
63. E.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 105.29 (Supp. 1978).
64. See notes 20-41 supra and accompanying text.
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water law and the ground water law would both have to apply to some
of the same water sources-an absurd result. Thus, either the statutory
definition of ground water must limit what is stream water for purposes
of regulation, or the statutory definition of ground water must be lim-
ited by the term "stream water" as that term is used to define property
interests.
The holding in Lawton necessarily means that the statutory defini-
tion of ground water is to be limited by the property concept of stream
water at least to the extent that stream water includes source water for a
spring. The approach of the court suggests that the property concept of
stream water might limit the statutory definition of ground water in its
full sweep. To press the logic of the Lawton case to its ultimate conclu-
sion, however, would have the effect of writing the "cut bank" limita-
tion out of the statutory definition of ground water, thus removing from
the statute a definitional device designed to lend simplicity to the ad-
ministration of water resources within the state.65 Thus, the common
boundaries of the two systems for regulating water must presently be
viewed as being somewhat uncertain.
II. THE PROPERTY INTEREST IN OKLAHOMA GROUND WATER
Under the Oklahoma statutes, "The owner of land owns water
. . . flowing . . . under its surface, but not forming a definite
stream. 66 This sentence, first enacted into statute by the first Territo-
rial Legislature of Oklahoma in 1890,67 remains the statutory founda-
tion of property rights in percolating ground water in Oklahoma. The
only change which has been made in the statute which affects percolat-
ing ground water is the addition of a sentence which provides, "The use
of ground water shall be governed by the Oklahoma Ground Water
Law. ' 68 It has been suggested that the only purpose of this addition
was to prevent legislation reforming the stream water law69 from being
construed to alter the ground water law as it had evolved at the time of
65. See note 52 supra. The Lawton case is thus subject to criticism for its failure to consider
the ground water definition. This is not to say that the Lawton decision is necessarily unsound as
a matter of policy but only that the statutory analysis employed by the court is defective.
66. OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971).
67. Rarick I, supra note 6, at 11. See TERR. OKLA. STAT. § 4162 (1890). Rarick I and Rarick
II, supra note 6, describe the evolution of § 60 into its present form.
68. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 60, § 60 (1971) with TERR. OKLA. STAT. § 4162 (1890).
69. Act of June 10, 1963, ch. 205, §§ 1-5, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 267; Act of June 10, 1963, ch.
207, §§ 1-12, 1963 Okla. Sess. Laws 271.
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the amendment. 7° Thus, the statutory basis for property interests in
percolating ground water is substantively identical to the provision
originally enacted.
The statute ties ownership of subsurface water to the ownership of
land. It has been held, however, that the land owner has no claim to
any particular molecules of water.71 Further, the ownership of ground
water in place is of little practical significance. Thus, if the statutory
declaration that the owner of land owns ground water has any practical
meaning, it must include the right to withdraw the water from the land
and apply it to use.72 Judicial treatment of the statute has confirmed
the existence of this landowner's right.
The leading Oklahoma case discussing property rights in percolat-
ing ground water is Canada v. City of Shawnee.73 In that case, the city
had drilled twelve wells on a seventy acre tract of land in order to ob-
tain a supplementary municipal water supply. The land on which the
wells were drilled was seven or eight miles from the city. The plaintiffs
were farmers who owned adjoining or nearby land and who claimed
that the city's activities had dried up wells, springs, and even the land
itself. The plaintiffs sought to enjoin the city from pumping its wells.
The district court rendered judgment for the defendant; the Oklahoma
Supreme Court reversed.
The opinion of the court discusses the evolution of ground water
law from its earliest beginnings in England under the rule of absolute
ownership through the emergence of the American rule of reasonable
use. The city contended that the 1890 statute had adopted the absolute
ownership rule for Oklahoma.74 The court rejected that contention and
held that, although the city owned the water beneath the surface of its
land, the rights of an owner of water are, as is the case with all other
classes and forms of property, subject to "qualifications and conditions
respecting the rights of others in the ownership and enjoyment of their
70. Rarick II, supra note 6, at 25-26.
71. West Edmond Salt Water Disposal Ass'n v. Rosecrans, 204 Okla. 9, 226 P.2d 965 (1950),
appeal dismissed, 340 U.S. 924 (1951).
72. The law of oil and gas reaches a similar conclusion with respect to the rights of a land-
owner to withdraw oil and gas from beneath his land, although the law of oil and gas begins with
the premise that the landowner does not own the oil and gas under his land until he captures it.
See Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321 (Okla. 1975). The analogy between water law and oil and
gas law is significant in the constitutional analysis of the Oklahoma ground water law. See notes
125-26, 161 infra and accompanying text.
73. 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937).
74. Brief of Defendant in Error, Canada v. City of Shawnee 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694 (1937).
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own property and lives."75 The court thus concluded that the statute
did not preclude application of the American rule of reasonable use in
Oklahoma. Applying the American rule, the court held that the city's
use of water was unreasonable and should be enjoined, subject to the
city's exercise of the power of eminent domain and payment of just
compensation.76
The court engaged in an extensive discussion of the characteristics
of the American rule. That discussion is epitomized in the following
language quoted from the New Jersey opinion in Meeker v. East Or-
ange:7
7
The court [in Meeker] said that the rule of reasonable use as
applied to percolating waters "does not prevent the proper
user by any landowner of the percolating waters subjacent to
his soil in agriculture, manufacturing, irrigation, or otherwise;
nor does it prevent any reasonable development of his land by
mining or the like, although the underground water of neigh-
boring proprietors may thus be interfered with or diverted;
but it does prevent the withdrawal of underground waters for
distribution or sale for uses not connected with any beneficial
ownership or enjoyment of the land whence they are taken, if
it thereby result that the owner of adjacent or neighboring
land is interfered with in his right to the reasonable user [sic]
of subsurface water upon his land, or if his wells, springs, or
streams are thereby materially diminished in flow or his land
is rendered so arid as to be less valuable for agriculture, pas-
turage, or other legitimate uses.78
The rule which thus emerges is one which permits substantial latitude
for uses of ground water made on the land from which it is taken,79 but
which allows water to be transported off of the land only where there is
no material interference with the rights of adjoining or nearby land-
owners.8 0 The rule emerging from Canada permits substantial latitude
75. 179 Okla. at 56, 64 P.2d at 698-99.
76. Id at 58, 64 P.2d at 701 (on rehearing).
77. 77 N.J.L. 623, 74 A. 379 (1909).
78. 179 Okla. at 55, 64 P.2d at 697.
79. Professor Rarick suggests that malicious or wasteful uses would be forbidden but that the
case leaves some doubt about whether any other use on the land from which the water was taken
would be forbidden. Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 411.50. Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 410-11. It is important to stress that even where the use
challenged is one made at a distance from the water source, the rule adopted in Canada does not
flatly enjoin such a use, but enjoins it only where it causes material interference with the rights of
those who own land over the source. A question arises whether the protection thus afforded is of a
particular means of diversion or only of the reasonable availability of the water from the land. A
19791
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for uses made on the land. The facts in Canada, however, did not re-
quire the court to address the extent to which uses on overlying land
strict reading of the excerpt from Meeker suggests that if there are wells, springs or streams on his
land the landowner is entitled to protection of them. The Canada court did not address this issue.
The Canada court seems to have had nothing more than an unrefined concept of harm in
mind. The court states as its conclusion to an analysis of the cases in other jurisdictions, "[B]ut the
majority of recent decisions stop short at and forbid the harmful extraction of percolating water
for sale at a distance." 179 Okla. at 55, 64 P.2d at 697 (emphasis supplied). But nowhere does the
court specifically address the question of the precise nature of the interference forbidden.
In City of Stillwater v. Cundff, 184 Okla. 375, 87 P.2d 947 (1939), a case almost identical to
Canada on its facts, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had an opportunity to address the issue of
precisely what is protected by the American rule. There the city had pleaded specially that if the
plaintiff landowner had deepened his well he would have had an adequate water supply despite
the city's pumping activities. If the court had addressed the merits of the plea and found it legally
sustainable, then it would have been possible to conclude that the only protection afforded a
landowner was protection of reasonable access to his ground water, not protection of any particu-
lar means of diversion. However, the court avoided the merits by finding there was competent
evidence of a permanent injury to the plaintiff, with the court's description of the evidence includ-
ing a reference to testimony which had been given at trial that the deepening of the wells was
impractical. Id at 376, 87 P.2d at 948.
In City of Enid v. Crow, 316 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1957), the issue was resolved. Once again the
factual setting was similar to that of Canada, with some important added facts. In Crow, when the
plaintiffs had noticed that their water supply was being depleted, they had complained to the city.
The city had responded to the complaint by drilling a deeper well for the plaintiffs, and the plain-
tiffs had equipped the new well with a new pump and a new pump house. The new well had,
however, failed to enable the plaintiffs to obtain sufficient water to run more than one faucet at a
time, whereas the old well had produced enough water to run three faucets at a time before the
city began to pump its municipal supply. The court affirmed an award of damages consisting of
two elements: first, the difference between the value of the land supplied with enough water to run
three faucets simultaneously and the value of the land supplied with enough water to run only one
faucet; and second, the expenses that the plaintiff had incurred in equipping the new well. The
recognition of the expenses of equipping the new well indicates that protection is to be given a
particular means of diversion, not simply the availability of water in the land.
Crow leaves some questions unanswered. First, if no action is taken to deepen a well which
suffers interference from a neighbor's pumping, are damages limited to the cost of deepening the
well or are they measured by the diminution in the value of the property occasioned by the decline
in the production of water from the old well? In short, does a duty exist which is analogous to the
duty to mitigate damages found in the law of contracts? This question is not easily answered as a
matter of policy. On one hand, where the expedient of deepening and re-equipping a well will
avoid large losses, to award an injured party the diminution of land value where he has not taken
the expedient steps would seem to confer upon him a windfall. On the other hand, as the facts in
Crow itself show, the benefit to be derived from deepening a well may be speculative, and it is
questionable whether the law should make an investment of resources in speculation a condition
to full protection of one's rights.
The second unanswered question is more basic than the first, although related. It is whether
the law should protect a landowner who has not expended resources on developing a means of
diversion against a lowering of the water table or whether his protection should be limited to
depletions which make it unreasonably expensive to obtain his groundwater. Where the interfer-
ence affects natural surface flow such as stream water or spring water, then perhaps he should, as
suggested by Meeker, be given protection, since the lack of any need to seek water below the
surface may be an element in the value of his land. (But, such ground water may be part of a
stream and thus not his to own in any event. See notes 30-38 Supra and accompanying text.) The
withdrawal of ground water which does not manifest itself in an impact on surface supplies is less
clearly an element influencing value, simply because information about a purely subsurface
source is less easily available.
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would be permitted to interfere with uses on other overlying land. In
fact, no Oklahoma case has dealt with this dimension of the property
interest in ground water.8 Canada, however, contains extensive dicta
on the question. The court observed:
[Flew if any cases can be found where American courts have
denied a landowner the right to draw as much percolating
water from under his land as he needs, even though it hurts
his neighbor, so long as the use to which he puts it bears some
reasonable relationship to the natural use of his land, and
even though such use of the land be industrial and not agri-
cultural.82
The court's use of the general principle of property law that rights of
ownership are qualified by the rights of others 3 suggests that some ac-
commodation between competing uses made on land overlying the
source should be made. 4 In fact, the court describes the American rule
81. The cases discuss the impact of statutory regulation of ground water use on the relation-
ship between parties, all of whom are using water on the land from which it is taken. See, e.g.,
Hodges v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 580 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1978); Texas County Irrigation
and Water Resources Ass'n v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 570 P.2d 49 (Okla. 1977); Lowrey v. Hodges,
555 P.2d 1016 (Okla. 1976).
82. 179 Okla. at 55, 64 P.2d at 696.
83. See note 75 supra and accompanying text.
84. That some such accommodation should follow from the adoption of the American rule of
reasonable use is suggested by the more or less contemporaneous development in Oklahoma of
the reasonable use theory of riparian rights in surface waters. In Broady v. Furray, 163 Okla. 204,
21 P.2d 770 (1933), and in Martin v. British Am. Oil Producing Co., 187 Okla. 193, 102 P.2d 124
(1940), the Oklahoma Supreme Court referred to the rule limiting riparian rights as dictated by
"due regard to the right and necessities of others interested." 187 Okla. at 195, 102 P.2d at 126.
Cf. 163 Okla. at 204, 21 P.2d at 771 (syllabus by the court). Neither Broady nor Martin involved
the allocation of water between riparians, both of whom were withdrawing it for use, so neither
opinion had to deal with the question of whether the quantity withdrawn by each would have to
be adjusted to meet the needs of the other. However, in Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197
Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946), the court, referring to both Broady and Martin, affirmed a lower
court decree which enjoined the defendant from taking as much water as it needed, while preserv-
ing to the plaintiff no more than he needed, despite a contention with support in the language of
the statute that plaintiff was entitled to the entire natural flow of the stream. See generally Rarick
, supra note 6, at 11-19.
The rule of reasonable use as applied to groundwater is stated by the Canada court: "[E]ach
landowner is restricted to a reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable use of his own
property, in view of the similar rights of others." 179 Okla. at 54, 64 P.2d at 696. The parallel
between this statement and the principle stated in Broady and Martin and relied upon to allocate
water in Stanolindis evident, and a similar parallel exists between the riparian rights principle and
the general principle of property law referred to in Canada. See note 75 supra and accompanying
text. This parallelism leads one to believe that had a problem of allocation between landowners
using water on land overlying the source ever been presented to the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
a common law setting, see note 81 supra and accompanying text, the court might have undertaken
to find an accommodation as it did in Stanolind. The question may now be mooted, however, by
the adoption of statutory allocation schemes.
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as simply an application of that general principle.8 5
The court's summary of the reasonable use principle as gleaned
from the cases suggests one basis for accommodation. The court states
that a landowner is entitled to use whatever quantity of water he needs
without regard to the effect of his use on others "so long as the use to
which he puts it bears some reasonable relationshp to the natural use of
his land .. ." Thus, other landowners will have a claim against a
landowner who uses water in a way which bears no reasonable rela-
tionship to the natural use of his land. In addition, a landowner mak-
ing such a use would not be entitled to protection against others. Since
the natural use of land may vary from region to region, a use of water
related to the natural use of land in a relatively well-watered area may
not be considered such a use in an arid region. Thus, the protection to
which one is entitled and the type of interference against which one is
protected may well depend upon a concept not unlike that of "benefi-
cial use" which characterizes prior appropriation law.87
The court rejects the notion that the American rule commands an
apportionment of water between adjacent landowners.88 The reason
for the rejection of an apportionment notion is significant as one ob-
serves that the Canada court thought the American rule to be merely a
gloss on the English rule of absolute ownership.8 9 The court justifies its
rejection of apportionment by observing that
such a thing is often, if not always, impossible, and it was this
same impossibility which gave rise to the English rule itself
... .If the rule of reasonable use should attempt in actual
practice an apportionment of percolating water between adja-
cent landowners, it would serve to illustrate the necessity of
the English rule.90
If the impossibility of apportionment justifies rejecting the princi-
ple of apportionment, then the reasons the court thought apportion-
85. 179 Okla. at 54-55, 64 P.2d at 696.
86. 179 Okla. at 55, 64 P.2d at 697 (emphasis added).
87. See Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d
972 (1935); 1 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 85-93 (R. Clark ed. 1967). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 850B (a) (rent. Draft No. 17, 1971). Pushed to an extreme, this approach
might deny certain landowners any right to use ground water at all. This would seem to contra-
vene the statutory rights of ownership in the water.
With respect to the concept of "beneficial use," the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently
suggested that the concept is less flexible than suggested in the text. Hodges v. Oklahoma Water
Resources Bd., 580 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1978). See note 208 infra and accompanying text.
88. 179 Okla. at 55, 64 P.2d at 696.
89. Id at 55, 64 P.2d at 697.
90. Id at 54-55, 64 P.2d at 696.
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ment to be impossible must be examined. If the impossibility can be
overcome, then perhaps apportionment is not inappropriate in
Oklahoma. Unfortunately, the court does not discuss why it thought
apportionment was impossible other than to suggest that the reasons
are the same reasons which justify the English rule. Analysis of the
opinion itself must end at this point as the court is equally silent on the
reasons justifying the English rule.
A clue to the court's thoughts may be found in the brief of the
defendant in error:
The English or common law rule seems to be rested at bottom
upon the maxim, "Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad coelum
et ad interos, [sic]," 9 1 and has also been upheld by numerous
courts from considerations of public policy; (1) because the
existence, origin, movement, and course of such waters, and
the causes which govern and direct their movements, are so
secret, occult, and concealed that an attempt to administer
any set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in
hopeless uncertainty, and would be therefore practically im-
possible; (2) because any such recognition of correlative right
would interfere, to the material detriment of the common-
wealth, with drainage and agriculture, mining, the construc-
tion of highways and railroads, with sanitary regulations,
building and the general progress of improvement in works of
embellishment and utility.92
Thus, the Canada court was informed of two reasons for the soundness
of the English rule: first, lack of a factual foundation for administering
any other rule; second, diminution of public welfare through the inter-
ference with valuable activities which the correlative rights princi-
ple-a rule of apportionment-would entail.93
As to the second reason, to the extent that the beneficial activities
which cannot be carried on involve the use of water, the English rule
carries as much potential for interference as any other rule since valua-
ble activities requiring water are entirely at the mercy of anyone mak-
ing a subsequent demand on the common supply. The Canada court
91. To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the sky and to the depths.
92. Brief of Defendant in Error at 30, Canada v. City of Shawnee 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694
(1937). These reasons are almost identical to the reasons given in Acton v. Blundell, 12 M.&.W.
324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843), cited by the Canada court as the first announcement of the
English rule. See 179 Okla. at 54, 64 P.2d at 696.
93. Cf. Acton v. Blundell, 12 M.&.W. 324, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223 (Ex. 1843). In Acton, the court
speaks of the second reason in terms reminiscent of the balancing of benefits and burdens princi-
ple used in equity.
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seems to have recognized this in its statement that "it was those who
sought an unfair and unconscionable advantage from the English rule
who necessitated a limitation on that rule. .... ,94
The stress of the second reason, however, seems to be on the pro-
tection of beneficial activities which require the drainage of ground
water, such as construction, swamp drainage, and mining, rather than
on the use of ground water.95 It is unlikely, however, that drainage
problems influenced the decision in Canada, since both parties were
seeking to use the water, not to dispose of it as a nuisance. It is further
unlikely that drainage problems would rise to such significant propor-
tions in Oklahoma that needed drainage would materially deplete
ground water supplies, except in connection with petroleum, gas, and
mining operations, which entail penetrations deep into the earth.96
It is likely that the Oklahoma Supreme Court was more concerned
with the lack of a factual foundation for administering any rule other
than the English rule than it was with any interference with valuable
activities which might follow from the adoption of the correlative rights
theory. If this surmise is correct, then supplying the factual foundation
would remove the most significant obstacle to a system of apportion-
ment. Whether or not the surmise is correct, supplying the factual
foundation would remove the most persuasive objection to an appor-
tionment system. This observation is particularly interesting since both
the Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1949 and the Oklahoma Ground
Water Law of 1972 mandate the gathering of hydrological data as the
basis for the administrative allocation systems that they adopt.97
If the foregoing analysis is sound, then the contours of the Ameri-
can rule of reasonable use as adopted in Oklahoma may be considera-
bly different from those contemplated by Canada. Indeed, obviating
the reasons for rejecting apportionment may have the effect of ex-
panding the scope of permissible use at a distance from the land.9 8 It
certainly has the effect of permitting greater restrictions on uses made
on the land than those envisioned by the Canada court under the con-
94. 179 Okla. at 55, 64 P.2d at 697.
95. Acton involved drainage of a mine. See notes 92-93 supra.
96. But see OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.2 (Supp. 1978).
97. Compare OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1007-1010, 1015 (1971) (repealed 1972) Ivilh OKLA,
STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.4-.9 (Supp. 1978).
98. The opinion in Canada seems to setup apportionment and "application [of the American
rule] to concrete cases" (which yields the rule substantially restricting uses off of the land) as
alternative approaches to the allocation problem. If the objection to apportionment can be obvi-
ated, then the choice of the alternative rule seems to be less compelled.
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ditions of "impossibility" 99 that the court felt obtained. The only situa-
tions which might require relatively unrestrained rights to remove
water would be those circumstances where the extraction of the water
was to eliminate a nuisance, 10° and the practial impact of these excep-
tional situations is likely to be insignificant.
The American rule of reasonable use is the basic property rule of
percolating water in Oklahoma, and it has survived the enactment of
statutes regulating the use of percolating water. Both the Ground
Water Law of 1949 and the Ground Water Law of 1972 pay express
homage to the concept that the owner of land owns the water beneath
it.'' In addition, two opinions of the Oklahoma Supreme Court de-
cided after the enactment of the 1949 law indicate that the American
rule of reasonable use survived that statute. In City of Enid v. Crow,'0 2
the court, without reference to the ground water law, affirmed an award
of damages based upon interference with interests protected under the
rule announced in Canada. More striking is Bowles v. City of Enid,t°3
because the court had to determine whether the ground water law pro-
vided the exclusive means by which the city could acquire rights in
ground water or whether the city would acquire those rights by exercise
of the power of eminent domain; thus, the court could not overlook the
ground water law. The court noted:
The conclusion here reached, [that the ground water law does
not foreclose recourse to the power of eminent domain] in no
manner forecloses any right or privilege in the reasonable use
of underground waters of owners of adjacent lands. Their
rights are recognized in our Shawnee and Stillwater
decisions. . . .
The implication of this language is that the property rights protected
against uncompensated takings are defined by the American rule of
reasonable use. Thus, the regulation of the use of ground water must
observe the limits set by these property rights.
99. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
100. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.2 (Supp. 1978).
101. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp.
1978). This is a particularly significant feature of the 1949 law since it is basically a prior appro-
priation statute. See note 118 infra and accompanying text.
102. 316 P.2d 834 (Okla. 1957).
103. 206 Okla. 611, 245 P.2d 730 (1952).
104. Id at 616, 245 P.2d at 734 (emphasis supplied). For a discussion of the Stillwater case,
see note 80 supra.
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III. THE REGULATION OF THE USE OF OKLAHOMA GROUND
WATER
A. The Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1949
The first effort in Oklahoma to impose systematic control of
ground water use occurred in 1949 with the enactment of a comprehen-
sive ground water law. 05 The 1949 law expressly recognized that sub-
surface water is owned by the owner of the land beneath which it is
found by making ownership of the land a condition precedent to the
withdrawal of water found beneath its surface. 0 6 Four important limi-
tations, however, were placed on the right of a landowner to use the
water located beneath his land.
The first limitation is perhaps not properly described as a limita-
tion but rather as a legislative elaboration of a concept which may be
implicit in the American rule of reasonable use. As discussed above, 0 7
the rights of a landowner may be limited under the reasonable use doc-
trine by a concept akin to beneficial use.'08 The Ground Water Law of
1949 made beneficial use an express condition of the right to use
ground water.'09 In addition, the complementary concept, "waste,"
was defined.' 0 Under the statute, waste included: taking or using
ground water so that it was lost for beneficial use; excessive transporta-
tion loss; permitting loss into previous materials encountered in a well;
and permitting pollution of a fresh water basin."'
The second limitation prevented the issuance of a permit for the
use of ground water in excess of the average annual recharge of the
ground water basin." 2 The pre-1949 common law rules placed no re-
strictions on the amount of water a landowner could apply to the land
from which the water was taken except those restrictions implicit in the
requirement that the use of water have a reasonable relationship to the
natural use of the land." 3 The Ground Water Law of 1949, on the
105. Act of June 6, 1949, ch. 11, §§ 1-19, 1949 Okla. Sess. Laws 641. As subsequently
amended, this statute was codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 §§ 1001-1019 (1971) (repealed 1972).
106. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
107. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
108. But. f note 208 infra and accompanying text.
109. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1005, 1006, 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
110. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1002 (1971) (repealed 1972).
11 Id. 1 The statute also defined waste as extraction of water in excess of the average annual
recharge of the area owned by the landowner and reduction of the yield of existing wells drilled by
prior appropriators. See notes 112-20 infra and accompanying text.
112. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
113. See note 86 supra and accompanying text.
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other hand, introduced the concept of limiting the rate at which water
was used in accordance with the conditions of supply.
Under the 1972 law, the limitation of quantity to the average an-
nual recharge has important consequences for the recognition which
must be accorded rights perfected under the 1949 law. 14 In this re-
gard, however, it may be significant that, prior to 1965, the express pro-
scription was against the issuance of permits for use in excess of the
average annual recharge, and the statute did not expressly state that
rights acquired other than under a permit were subject to this limita-
tion. Since the statute at that time provided for permits only after adju-
dication of rights in a ground water basin,"15 it is possible to read the
statute as permitting the establishment of rights through adjudication
without regard to the average annual recharge limitation while impos-
ing the limitation on rights in the same basin that arise after adjudica-
tion. Such an anomalous interpretation of the statute is probably
contrary to the statutory intent. In any event, it has no applicability to
rights based on uses initiated after July 14, 1965, because legislation
which went into effect on that date extended the permit procedure to
preadjudication uses 116 and expanded the definition of "waste" to in-
clude use in excess of the average annual rate of recharge." 7
The third limitation is found in the method adopted by the statute
to resolve disputes over water. The principle upon which these disputes
were resolved was priority in time."' "Prior appropriation," however,
would not be an apt description of the system which evolved, because
the Oklahoma water administrator tied the amount of water an appli-
cant was permitted to withdraw to the amount of land he owned or
leased overlying the basin rather than to the use to which the applicant
proposed to put the water." 9 On the other hand, "correlative rights"
would not be an apt description either because disputes were to be set-
tled on a time priority principle and because the amount of water allo-
cated administratively, although tied to the amount of land owned or
leased, was not a simple proportion of the annual yield of the basin, but
114. See notes 147-48 infra and accompanying text.
115. See notes 127-30 infra and accompanying text.
116. Act of July 14, 1965, ch. 471, §§ 3-6, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit.
82, §§ 1007, 1008, 1010, 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972)).
117. Act of July 14, 1965, ch. 471, § 1, 1965 Okla. Sess. Laws (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 82,
§ 1002 (1971) (repealed 1972)).
118. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1005, 1015 (1971) (repealed 1972). The statute even applied the
priority principle retroactively to prestatute uses.
119. Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 421.
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was rather a fixed amount per acre.' 20 Thus, no attempt was made to
guarantee every overlying owner a share of the water in the basin.
The method of resolving disputes over ground water adopted by
the 1949 law was arguably a method of apportioning water, thus run-
ning afoul of the Oklahoma Supreme Court's rejection of apportion-
ment between landowners.' 2' To the extent that the judicial disdain for
a rule of apportionment was based upon lack of information about
ground water resources, the statute met this objection by mandating
hydrological surveys.' 22 The response of the statute, however, was in-
complete in that the statute did not make the completion of the hydro-
logical studies a condition precedent to the establishment of the priority
of a claim to appropriate ground water. 23 Moreover, after 1965, the
completion of a hydrological study was not a condition precedent to the
exercise by the Water Resources Board of its licensing powers.' 24
A more serious objection to the statute was that the method of
apportionment adopted by the 1949 law had the potential effect of de-
nying all use of water to those landowners who sought to use their
water at a point relatively late in time. In effect, the statute could have
been construed as transferring the water rights of those who made no
use of their water until a point relatively late in time to those who had
started to use water from the same source at an early time.125 In the oil
and gas area the right to withdraw the resource is tied, as it is in the
120. Id The fixed amount was two acre-feet per year. Rarick indicates that claims to greater
amounts would be recognized if the applicant could show both a beneficial use and an average
annual yield of a greater amount. There were also apparently some exceptions for municipalities.
For example, in the order establishing prior rights in Tillman County, the City of Tipton was
accorded a recognized priority for 347 acre-feet of water per year, to be extracted from wells
located on a 25,000 square foot parcel of land. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL
ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN TILLMAN TERRACE AND ALLUVIAL
BASIN, TILLMAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Feb. 14, 1978). Applying the two acre-foot formula, the
city would have been entitled to only slightly more than one acre-foot per year. See also,
OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, Allocations to the City of Guymon, FINAL ORDER Es-
TABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN TEXAS COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Dec. 12, 1978);
Allocations to the Boise City Utilities Authority, FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND
WATER RIGHTS IN CIMARRON COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Jan. 9, 1979); Allocation to the Oklahoma
State Reformatory, FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN KIOWA
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (March 13, 1979). A municipality is, of course, required to make compensa-
tion if its withdrawal of water interferes with the right of adjoining and nearby landowners to
make reasonable use of ground water. Canada v. City of Shawnee, 179 Okla. 53, 64 P.2d 694
(1937); Bowles v. City of Enid, 206 Okla. 611, 245 P.2d 730 (1952).
121. See notes 87-96 supra and accompanying text.
122. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1007 (1971) (repealed 1972).
123. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1006 (1971) (repealed 1972).
124. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
125. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals considered an Oregon statute which admittedly may
have had the same effect upon riparian rights in Oregon; nevertheless, the statute was upheld
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case of ground water, to the ownership of the surface overlying the
source. The Oklahoma Supreme Court has held in such cases that
where certain owners are prohibited from exercising their rights of
withdrawal, another owner who is permitted to exercise his right of
withdrawal must account to the other owners for the profits made from
the sale of the oil and gas."2 6 Thus, it would seem that a statute which
prohibited a landowner from withdrawing ground water to protect the
ability of another landowner to continue to withdraw a given amount
would have the effect of depriving the landowner whose use was pro-
hibited of a valuable property right without adequate compensation.
The fourth limitation was a licensing requirement imposed by the
statute. Prior to 1965, the applicability of the licensing provision de-
pended upon whether the existing ground water rights in the area had
been adjudicated or not. In unadjudicated areas, the priority of a claim
could be established by an application procedure amounting to little
more than a notice, 27 although apparently some control was exercised
over the amount of water for which an application would be ac-
cepted.12 8 Further, since the application procedure established the pri-
ority of a mere claim, rather than a right, to appropriate ground water,
the claim could presumably be rejected upon adjudication of the
ground water rights in the area.
In adjudicated areas, the Board was given authority to control the
use of ground water through a full licensing procedure. 2 9 In 1965, the
distinction between adjudicated areas and unadjudicated areas for pur-
poses of the licensing procedure was abandoned, and authority to con-
trol all water uses by licensing was conferred upon the administrator. 30
B. The Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1972
1. Basic Scheme
The 1972 Act13 ' completely rewrote the prior Oklahoma ground
water regulatory statute. The basic schemes of the 1972 Act were that
against constitutional challenge. California-Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73
F.2d 555 (1934), affirmed on other grounds, 295 U.S. 142 (1935).
126. Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321 (Okla. 1975). The fact that the party who was with-
drawing the oil and gas was a municipality may have had some effect on the outcome of this case,
although the language of the opinion would seem to apply more generally.
127. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1006 (1971) (repealed 1972).
128. Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 421, 424.
129. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1007, 1008, 1010, 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
131. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.1-.22 (Supp. 1978).
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ground water basins be identified, that the maximum annual yield from
each water basin be determined by hydrological studies, that the
amount and location of land overlying such ground water basin be de-
termined, and that the maximum annual yield from the basin be di-
vided among the owners of land above the basin in proportion to the
surface area owned.
Special provision is made for municipal water supplies. A munici-
pality may use the water allocated to platted land within its corporate
limits without regard to whether it owns the land. Before the munici-
pality may use the water, however, it must be able to supply water to
the platted land to which the water is allocated, 1 32 and it must obtain a
permit. The requirement that the municipality be able to supply water
to the land to which the water it claims is allocated presumably answers
the constitutional objections which might be raised concerning this pro-
vision of the statute.' 33 Further, any wells must be drilled on the plat-
ted land and not less than 600 feet within the municipal boundaries.3 4
2. Domestic Exemption
Both the 1949 Act and the 1972 Act exempt domestic uses from
their coverage. The 1972 exemption, however, is slightly narrower than
the 1949 exemption. The 1949 Act exempts "using ground water for
domestic uses, for household purposes, or for the purpose of watering
of stock, and for the irrigation of land not exceeding a total of three
acres in area for the growing of gardens, orchards, and lawns." 35 The
1972 law exempts "the use of water by a natural individual or by afamily
or household for household purposes, for farm and domestic animals up
to the normal grazing capacity of the land and for the irrigation of land
132. A municipality that uses water which would otherwise be allocated to the owner of plat-
ted land within the corporate limits must make water available to the platted land on the same
basis as it is available to other residents of the municipality. 77 OKLA. Op. Arr'y GEN. 277 (1977).
133. See Frost v. Ponca City, 541 P.2d 1321 (Okla. 1975). Water must be supplied to the
platted land to which the ground water is allocated on the same basis as it is available to other
residents of the municipality. 77 OKLA. OP. ATr'y GEN. 277 (1977). Thus, a municipality can
presumably make its normal charge for water service to such land. This is consistent with the
approach of Frost in which the city was allowed credit for the expenses associated with the recov-
ery of the hydrocarbons located beneath plaintiffs' land in accounting for profits to those land-
owners.
134. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.21 (Supp. 1978). Apart from its right to take the water allo-
cated to platted land within its corporate limits, a municipality seeking to develop a municipal
water supply from a ground water source must apparently either buy or lease enough land to
entitle it to withdraw what it seeks to withdraw in accordance with the normal proportioning
scheme of the Act. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.9, 1020.11 D (Supp. 1978).
135. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1003 (1971) (repealed 1972).
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not exceeding a total of three acres in area for the growing of gardens,
orchards, and lawns."' 36 The primary effect of the change is to extend
the coverage of the ground water law to withdrawals for use in live-
stock feeding operations 3 7 and to uses which might arguably be do-
mestic but which are not uses by private households, such as uses by
resorts.
The apparent purpose of the domestic exemption is to save both
the state and the typically small domestic user the expense associated
with an administrative proceeding in connection with the use of water
having only a de minimis affect on the ground water supply. The con-
tention that the domestic exemption creates a domestic priority has
been rejected by the Oklahoma Supreme Court. 138 In this connection,
a change in the basic approach of the exemption statute from that used
in the 1949 law is significant. The 1949 law provided that the statute
did not interfere with domestic use, rather clearly suggesting a domestic
priority. 3 9 The 1972 law states simply that a permit is not required for
domestic use, 40 an approach which is easily susceptible to the interpre-
tation given it by the Oklahoma Supreme Court.
3. Ground Water Mining
Unlike the 1949 law, which contemplates use of only the average
annual recharge of the basin,' 4' the 1972 law expressly contemplates
ground water mining. The statute specifies that the depletion schedule
used be such as not to exhaust the basin before July 1, 1993.142 If ex-
haustion of the basin over such a short depletion schedule would per-
mit production of water in excess of the amount required for beneficial
use, however, then the depletion schedule may extend beyond July 1,
1993, since the statute specifies only a minimum basin life, not a maxi-
mum. 143 In the eastern part of Oklahoma, this may well be the mode of
136. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.1(B) (Supp. 1978) (emphasis supplied).
137. See Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 423.
138. Hodges v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 580 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1978). In fact, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court reversed itself on this issue. An earlier opinion in the same case, subse-
quently withdrawn by the Oklahoma Supreme Court, expressly declares a domestic priority.
Hodges v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 31 (1976), opinion withdrawn, 49
OKLA. B.A.J. 1201 (1978).
139. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1004 (1971) (repealed 1972).
140. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.3 (Supp. 1978).
141. See notes 112-13 supra and accompanying text.
142. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.5 (Supp. 1978).
143. Id
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administration. 44 It is even conceivable that an infinite life may be
used in some basins so that the administration of water use is based on
average annual recharge, as it was under the 1949 law.
4. Establishing the Parameters of Regular Administration
a. Protection of Prior Rights
The 1972 law sets forth a two-step process for establishing the ba-
sis upon which the water within a particular ground water basin will be
allocated to individual owners. The first step is the ascertainment of
prior rights. This is an administrative procedure in Oklahoma, based
upon the records of the Water Resources Board and upon the evidence
adduced at a hearing on the matter. 145 So far,'46 final orders determin-
ing prior rights have been issued for five counties in Oklahoma. 147
The change from the average annual recharge policy under the
1949 law to the ground water mining policy under the 1972 law creates
a problem with respect to the coordination of rights under the old law
and rights under the new law. Specifically, the problem is whether the
holder of a water right acquired under the old law could successfully
challenge a use made under the new law which had the effect of long
term depletion of the common water supply. In other words, where
prior rights have been established based upon the policy against mining
expressed in the old law, can the Water Resources Board switch to a
policy permitting mining in the administration of such a basin?
The statute protecting prior rights arguably permits the recogni-
tion of rights under prior law on the basis of a controlled ground water
mining policy rather than on the basis of a policy permitting the use of
only the average annual recharge. Although the 1972 law protects the
right to use ground water established under prior law, it defines that
right in terms of only one dimension- quantity.14 8 It does not define
the right in terms of duration nor in terms of the maintenance of partic-
ular ground water conditions. Thus, the protection afforded prior
rights is arguably only protection of the right to use the quantity of
water used before the enactment of the 1972 law for whatever period of
144. Conversation with James Barnett and J.A. Wood, supra note 4.
145. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.7 (Supp. 1978); Okla. Water Resources Board Reg. §§ 670.1-
.14 (1973) (amended Dec. 14, 1976).
146. As of March 31, 1979.
147. Letter from J.A. Wood, responding to letter from author dated March 13, 1979. See note
5 supra.
148. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.14 (Supp. 1978).
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time and under whatever conditions of supply obtain while the water
supply lasts under the mining policy.
Another question related to the change from an average annual
recharge policy to a mining policy is the recognition which must be
accorded uses commenced under prior law (whether under permit or
otherwise) which hydrological studies now show to require water in
excess of the limit set by the average annual recharge. Arguably prior
law allowed no such uses to ripen into a right to use water-at least to
the extent such uses commenced after 1965 149 -so no recognition is ac-
corded such uses under the 1972 law.15
0
If quantity is the only dimension of prior rights which must be
recognized under the 1972 law,15 ' then there is no statutory require-
ment that any priority system be recognized among the prior users.
The administrative practice, however, is contrary to this conclusion. 15 2
As to the priority of rights under prior law and of rights acquired under
the 1972 law, the statutory language' 53 suggests that rights under the
prior law are superior to rights acquired under the 1972 law.'54
The narrowing of the exemption for domestic uses may create a
problem in administration with respect to the recognition which must
be extended uses commenced under the broader 1949 exemption and
which are no longer exempt under the 1972 Act. The problem is a
minor one since it is likely to arise infrequently. It will be difficult to
resolve when it does arise because no clear guidelines exist for its reso-
lution.15- Domestic uses under the 1949 law are excluded from the
149. See notes 115-16 supra and accompanying text.
150. The grounds for denying recognition would be that any permit for such a use granted
under the 1949 law was improperly granted and any application filed prior to 1965 for such use of
water in a basin which was unadjudicated as of July 14, 1965, could never ripen into a water right.
However, to the extent such uses were accompanied by applications under the old law, the appli-
cations could be recognized as applications under the new law. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.7
(Supp. 1978).
151. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
152. Okla. Water Resources Board Reg. § 670.2 (1973) (amended Dec. 14, 1976). See also
OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER
RIGHTS IN TILLMAN TERRACE AND ALLUVIAL BASIN, TILLMAN COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Feb. 14,
1978); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN TEXAS COUNTY,
OKLAHOMA (Dec. 12, 1978); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN
CIMARRON COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (Jan. 9, 1979); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISHING PRIOR GROUND
WATER RIGHTS IN BECKHAM COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (March 13, 1979); FINAL ORDER ESTABLISH-
ING PRIOR GROUND WATER RIGHTS IN KIOWA COUNTY, OKLAHOMA (March 13, 1979).
153. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.14 (Supp. 1978). Section 1020.14 prohibits the dep-
rivation of the quantity of water to which users who obtained rights under prior law would other-
wise be entitled.
154. Accord, Okla. Water Resources Bd. Regs. § 670.2 (1973) (amended Dec. 14, 1976).
155. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1004 (1971) (repealed 1972). This statute provided that the only
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schedules of priorities applying to other types of uses, 156 and the 1949
law gave express permission for domestic uses without regard to other
competing uses.'5 7 Therefore, the only way to recognize those uses
which were exempt from the 1949 law but which are not exempt from
the 1972 law-as well as to recognize the reliance interests formed with
respect to the former law-is to grant the formerly exempt uses first
priority in the prior rights determination required under the 1972
law.'58 It can be argued, however, that persons making such newly
nonexempt uses have no property interests which would entitle them to
an absolute priority over other nonexempt users.' 59 If this argument is
adopted, the Board would be free to accommodate these rights in the
system in some other way, such as by assigning them a priority accord-
ing to the date that their newly nonexempt use began.
Two constitutional issues arise with respect to the protection which
the 1972 law affords prior rights. The first is whether the protection
afforded is constitutionally sufficient. Arguably, it is. The principal in-
road the 1972 law makes into the rights obtained under the 1949 law is
in its permissive depletion of the ground water reservoir. If the Ameri-
can rule of reasonable use is the underlying property system in
Oklahoma ground water, 60 then the holder of a prior right has no pro-
tected property interest preventing depletion of the reservoir, since the
American rule of reasonable use is not inconsistent with ground water
mining. In fact, the freedom accorded a landowner to use water on
land overlying the source with little regard for the effect such use has
on other landowners is more suggestive of mining than of average an-
nual recharge administration of ground water resources.
Further, redefinition of prior rights in terms of the mining policy
can be justified as a limitation on the rights of prior users necessary to
protect the property interests of other landowners in the basin. As
provisions of the law which applied to domestic use were certain of the proscriptions against
waste, significantly not including the proscription against uses interferring with prior appropria-
tors.
156. See note 155 supra.
157. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1004 (1971) (repealed 1972).
158. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.7, 1020.14 (Supp. 1978).
159. This is true only to the extent that the American rule of reasonable use survived the 1949
law as the basis of ground water law, see notes 99-104 supra and accompanying text, and to the
extent that this rule permits beneficial uses on the land from which the water was taken, see notes
75-85 supra and accompanying text.
160. See notes 66-104 supra and accompanying text.
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such, it is a justifiable exercise of the police power. 16 ' To the extent
that changing from average annual recharge administration to a min-
ing policy makes water available in useable quantities to landowners
who, under the safe-yield prior appropriation policy, would have had
no right to withdraw water, the change in policy protects their right to
use what the law declares to be theirs.
The second constitutional problem relates to whether the recogni-
tion accorded prior rights is constitutionally permissible. The determi-
nation of this question hinges on the same factors discussed above in
relation to the constitutionality of the prior apropriation means of allo-
cation in Oklahoma. 62 The problem may be somewhat less intense
under the 1972 law, since in most places the recognition of prior rights
will leave at least some water available for allocation under the correla-
tive rights principle adopted by the 1972 law. All this really means,
however, is that prior rights are not protected under the 1972 law as
thoroughly as they were under former law. It does not mean that the
property rights of the other landowners have not been substantially in-
terferred with. Thus, it may be that recognition of prior rights under
the 1972 law is unconstitutional.
b. Determination of Maximum Annual Yield
The second step in establishing the basis upon which the water
within a ground water basin will be allocated is to combine the deter-
mination of prior rights and hydrological studies of the basin to deter-
mine how much water is available for new uses within the basin. A
final determination of the maximum annual yield within the basin is
made only after a hearing.' 63 Once the maximum annual yield has
been determined, the Board begins to issue regular permits authorizing
landowners to withdraw water in proportion to their shares of the max-
imum annual yield, determined on the basis of the surface area each
owns overlying the basin."
The determination of maximum annual yield is made separately
for each ground water basin. "Ground water basin" is defined by the
statute as "a distinct underground body of water overlain by contigu-
ous land and having substantially the same geological and hydrological
161. See, e.g., Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900); Champlin Refining Co. v. Corpo-
ration Comm'n, 286 U.S. 210 (1932).
162. See notes 125-26 supra and accompanying text.
163. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.6 (Supp. 1978).
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978).
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characteristics and yield capabilities."'6 Thus, each distinct geological
formation is a distinct ground water basin. An owner whose wells pen-
etrate two or more such formations should have a separate allocation
from each formation. The water taken by prior users should affect the
maximum annual yield calculation for a given formation only to the
extent that their water is drawn from that formation. Accumulating
and analyzing all of the information necessary to import such precision
into the calculation, however, presents serious practical problems. 66
Some other physical problems complicate the determination of
maximum annual yield. First, the statute is unclear on whether maxi-
mum annual yield is to be calculated in terms of the total amount of
water stored in the basin or whether it is to be calculated in terms of the
proportion of the water which is economically recoverable. 167 If calcu-
lated according to the total amount of water in storage, the amount
allocated to each user will increase. Moreover, the consequent increase
in the rate at which a permit holder may withdraw water from the ba-
sin will result in an earlier end to the useable life of the basin than that
contemplated by the depletion schedule used in the calculation. If so
calculated, persons commencing to use their allocation at a late point in
time may find difficulty in ever recovering water at the rate of their full
allocation. This result appears to be unlikely, however, since the Board
has determined to calculate the amount of water stored in terms of the
amount economically recoverable. 68
A second physical problem is that the configuration of the strata
confining a basin may mean that water is practically recoverable at cer-
tain points above the basin for a longer period of time than it is at other
points. Should the maximum annual yield calculation include all of
165. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.1(C) (Supp. 1978).
166. Conversation with J.A. Wood, Chief, Groundwater Division, Oklahoma Water Re-
sources Board, Feb. 16, 1978, at the offices of the Board, located in Oklahoma City. Another
practical problem is that inadequate information about some of the formations makes an accurate
determination of the natural characteristics and capacities of those formations quite difficult.
167. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.5 (Supp. 1978); conversation with J.A. Wood, supra note 166.
168. Telephone conversation with J.A. Wood, March 28, 1979. The maximum annual yield
order for Tillman County includes the following item as one of the bases upon which the maxi-
mum annual yield was calculated, "allowing a minimum 20 year life of the basin under the condi-
tion that at least 50% of the basin will still have a saturation of at least five (5) feet of fresh ground
water on July 1, 1993." OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL ORDER FOR DETERMINA-
TION OF THE MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD OF FRESH GROUND WATER FROM THE TILLMAN
COUNTY, OKLAHOMA, ALLUVIUM AND TERRACE BASIN (Dec. 12, 1978). Mr. Wood explains this
stipulation by advising that an irrigation well of minimum economical size (capacity of 250 gal-
lons per minute) requires that much saturated thickness in that particular basin. He further indi-
cated that the saturated thickness requirement would vary from basin to basin, depending upon
each basin's peculiar geological characteristics. Telephone conversation with J.A. Wood, supra.
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the water in the basin (or at least that portion thereof economically
recoverable) or should it include only that portion down to the maxi-
mum depth at which to the water can be had from substantially all
points on the surface overlying the basin? The statute avoids the ques-
tion by permitting the division of a basin into subbasins with a separate
calculation of maximum annual yield for each subbasin. 16 9 The geo-
logical configurations are such that a division of a basin into merely
two or three subbasins, however, would not solve the problem, and the
administration of the law would be greatly complicated. 170 In addition,
the hydrological connection between the subbasins could conceivably
make any separate allocation to a particular subbasin meaningless in
physical terms, since the water to supply the allocation might be drawn
off into another subbasin by withdrawals from such other subbasin.
The Board has solved this problem in another way in the case of
the Tillman County Order. The Board's solution is more or less a com-
promise. They approached the problem by first excluding from the ba-
sin all land which as of July 1, 1973, did not overlie a saturated
thickness great enough to supply an irrigation well of minimum eco-
nomical capacity. The maximum annual yield is calculated allowing
for depletion of the saturated thickness below such minimum levels
before July 1, 1993, under 50% of the remaining acreage.'1
7
c. Changes in Allocation Based on Revised Data
The Board is required to update its hydrological surveys at least
every ten years.' 72 As a result of such updating, the Board may revise
its maximum annual yield determination, but it may not decrease the
amount of water allocated per acre.' 73 If the later hydrological studies
indicate that the maximum annual yield as originally determined was
too high, the statute would seem to say that the allocation under a per-
mit granted after the revised study would nevertheless be determined
on the original basis. This would mean that the basin would be de-
pleted faster than had originally been contemplated.
74
169. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.5 (Supp. 1978).
170. Conversation with J.A. Wood, supra note 160.
171. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL ORDER FOR DETERMINATION OF THE
MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD OF FRESH GROUND WATER FROM THE TILLMAN COUNTY, OK-
LAHOMA, ALLUVIUM AND TERRACE BASIN (DEC. 12, 1978); Telephone conversation with J.A.
Wood, March 28, 1979.
172. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.4 (Supp. 1978).
173. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.6 (Supp. 1978).
174. If later permits from a ground water basin were for less water than earlier permits, the
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The problem could be alleviated by using time-limited permits
which expire at the date of the anticipated redetermination. The stat-
ute forbids permits limited to any shorter time than the anticipated ba-
sin life,'75 however, so time-limited permits are of limited utility.
d Well Spacing
The statute authorizes spacing orders. 176 Although authority for
spacing orders existed under the 1949 Act, this authority was exercised
sparingly. 177 Under the new act, spacing orders will probably be issued
for each basin at the time the maximum annual yield is determined. 7 8
The Attorney General of Oklahoma has expressed the opinion that the
Water Resources Board does not have the authority to order well spac-
ing prior to the completion of hydrological studies and the determina-
tion of the maximum annual yield.17 9
5. Transitional Rules
Pending completion of the initial hydrological studies, the Board is
authorized to issue temporary permits. The statute provides that the
minimum allocation under a temporary permit is two acre-feet per year
per acre of overlying land, although more may be allocated if the appli-
cant can show that a greater allocation is consistent with a twenty year
basin life.180 The Board requires a hydrological study in support of an
application for more than two-acre feet, and it is unlikely that an appli-
cant would go to the expense of providing such a study,' 8' especially in
view of the requirement that a temporary permit must be revalidated
annually. 82
same kind of constitutional objections as are addressed to the prior appropriation system might be
made. See note 125 supra and accompanying text.
175. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978).
176. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.17 (Supp. 1978).
177. Rarick IV, supra note 6, at 423.
178. Conversation with J.A. Wood, supra note 166.
179. 77 OKLA. Op. Arr'v GEN. 305 (1978).
180. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.11(B) (Supp. 1978).
181. Conversation with James Barnett and J.A. Wood, supra note 4. However, since regular
administration under the Act is tied closely to specific geological formations, the two acre-foot
limitation arguably applies to each basin underlying the land. Hence, one could arguably obtain a
temporary permit for two acre-feet for each underlying formation, and, in fact, some temporary
permits have been issued on that basis. Id But the statute speaks of two acre-feet per acre of
overlying land, not two acre-feet per basin per acre of overlying land, so the language of the
statute can be read as guaranteeing only two acre-feet, regardless of how many basins underlie the
land.
182. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.11(B) (Supp. 1978).
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The Oklahoma Supreme Court has rejected the contention that, in
view of the expense involved in developing a water supply under a tem-
porary permit, a temporary permit is tantamount to a permanent per-
mit. 8 3 The economic problem for a water developer is a real one,'84
however, and perhaps the legislature would be well advised to permit
the Board to set the amount of water allowable under a temporary per-
mit according to a reasonable estimate of the likely results of the hy-
drological studies. The Board does have limited discretion to grant a
temporary permit for an amount less than that mandated by the stat-
ute,'8 5 but that discretion is controlled by the use the applicant pro-
poses to make of the water rather than by an estimate of his ultimate
allocation.
The position taken by the Attorney General that mandatory well
spacing is not permitted prior to the completion of hydrological
surveys 1 6 exacerbates the economic problem for the water developer.
The water developer runs the risk that a well which he has drilled
under a temporary permit may not comply with the well spacing rules
adopted for the basin when regular administration of the basin begins
and well spacing orders are adopted. Thus, either the water developer
must cease using the well and suffer the loss when mandatory well
spacing orders are adopted by the Board, or an exception for the devel-
oper's well must be made in the well spacing orders, perhaps compro-
mising the effectiveness of the order. A better solution would be to
permit the adoption of a tentative mandatory well spacing order before
hydrological surveys are complete.
The position taken by the Oklahoma Attorney General seems to
be an unduly narrow interpretation of the well spacing statute. The
Attorney General's opinion is based upon the statutory requirements
that well spacing be "in relation to the allocation to the land overlying
the basin or sub-basin."' 87 This language would seem broad enough,
however, to include both temporary allocations of water under tempo-
rary permits as well as final allocations of water under regular permits.
183. Lowrey v. Hodges, 555 P.2d 1016, 1024 (Okla. 1976).
184. See id at 1022. Regular permits in Tillman County are for only half the amount pro-
vided for under temporary permits. Compare OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL
ORDER FOR DETERMINATION OF THE MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD OF FRESH GROUND WATER
FROM THE TILLMAN CouNTY, OKLAHOMA, ALLUVIUM AND TERRACE BASIN (Dec. 12, 1978) with
OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.11(B) (Supp. 1978).
185. See notes 204-10 infra and accompanying text.
186. See note 171 supra and accompanying text.
187. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.17 (Supp. 1978).
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Further, the statute expressly provides that the board may make well
spacing orders before issuing any permits, without specifying that the
reference is only to regular permits, such as are issued after the maxi-
mum annual yield has been determined.
5. Regular Permits: Final Allocation to Landowners
After the maximum annual yield of a ground water basin has been
determined, the Board begins to issue regular permits. To issue a regu-
lar permit the Board must find that the lands owned or leased by the
applicant overlie the basin, that the use the applicant intends to make
of the water is a beneficial use, and that waste will not occur. 188 The
statute provides that the Board "shall allocate to the applicant his pro-
portionate part of the maximum annual yield of the basin or sub-
basin."' 89 However, the requirement that the applicant demonstrate
that he intends to make a beneficial use of the water may mean that the
Board may issue a permit for less than the applicant's proportionate
share. 90
The only enforcement device provided by the 1972 Act is a provi-
sion requiring annual reports of water use. Failure to file such reports
empowers the Board to cancel the permit.' 9' Well metering is author-
ized only upon request of a majority of landowners within the basin or
the subbasin. 19 2 Violation of the Act is a misdemeanor, and each day
during which a violation continues after notice from the Board consti-
tutes a separate offense. 93
Although the 1949 law required that water be applied to beneficial
use within five years of the issuance of a permit, 9 4 the 1972 Act places
no time limit on application of water to beneficial use after the permit
is issued. Thus, it is consistent with the language of the statute for the
Board to grant a permit for a future beneficial use. The common law
concept of abandonment might be applied to terminate a permit under
which water had not been applied to beneficial use. However, since the
statute does not create rights, but rather manages preexisting rights
based on land ownership, the concept of abandonment would seem to
188. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978).
189. Id
190. See notes 204-10 infra and accompanying text.
191. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.12 (Supp. 1978).
192. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.19 (Supp. 1978).
193. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.22 (Supp. 1978).
194. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1013 (1971) (repealed 1972).
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have no applicability. Further, since no user is entitled to more than
his proportionate share of the maximum annual yield,19 5 the existence
of paper rights which are not put to use would seem to have little effect
on others entitled to use the water- other than to extend the basin life
beyond the date used to determine the annual yield. If time-limited
permits are used, 196 then any unused allocations, whether the subject of
a permit or not, could be reallocated when new applications are consid-
ered at the end of the basin life. This is true unless the limitation on
changes in the allocation based on revised hydrological information
197
is interpreted, as it well might be, to prevent downward revisions even
where no permits are outstanding. 198
Several factors influence the precise amount of water which is
available under a permit. The natural condition of the ground water
basin being considered influences the amount of water available. In
addition, as has been observed, 199 the Board may influence the maxi-
mum annual yield by making its calculations on the basis of a maxi-
mum basin life extending beyond July 1, 1993.
Prior rights may influence the precise amount of water available
under a permit in two ways. First, prior rights reduce the total amount
of water available for allocation to new uses.2°° Second, for a particu-
lar user who has a prior right, the prior right may be chargeable against
any right he might be entitled to under a permit under the terms of the
new law. The statute does not explicitly treat prior rights in this man-
ner. The section specifying the amount allocated under a regular per-
mit says simply that the permit "shall allocate to the applicant his
proportionate part of the maximum annual yield of the basin or sub-
basin," and then the defines proportionate part, with no reference to
prior rights.20' The section protecting prior rights states simply that the
new law is not to "be construed to deprive any person of any right to
the use of ground water in such quantities and amounts as were used or
were entitled to be used prior to the enactment hereof."2 2 A permit
which charged prior rights against a new proportionate allocation
195. Except under a short term special permit. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.11(C) (Supp.
1978).
196. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978).
197. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.6 (Supp. 1978).
198. See notes 173-74 supra and accompanying text.
199. See notes 141-44 supra and accompanying text.
200. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.14 (Supp. 1978).
201. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978).
202. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.14 (Supp. 1978).
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would arguably not deprive the applicant of his prior right to use
ground water as long as the combined recognition of prior rights and
new permit provided him his full allocation. The Oklahoma Water Re-
sources Board has requested an opinion from the Attorney General
resolving this particular question.20 3
Finally, the Board appears to have the authority to limit the
amount of water allocated to a particular user to the amount he can
beneficially use. The Attorney General of Oklahoma has issued an
opinion with respect to the Board's authority over temporary permits2°4
which, if followed, confers upon the Board the authority to issue both
regular and temporary permits to use less water than the amounts pro-
vided for by statute. The rationale for the opinion is that the statute
forbids the waste of water and that issuance of a permit to use an
amount in excess of that needed for beneficial use would be condoning
waste. Although the opinion deals only with temporary permits, the
statutes relied upon to support the opinion apply equally to regular and
to temporary permits.2 °5 Thus, despite statutory language which seems
to mandate the amount of water to be allocated under a permit,206 the
Board may have the authority to issue a permit for a lesser amount.
Decisions in other jurisdictions suggest that even more power may
be hidden in the beneficial use concept. In California, for example, the
courts have adopted the view that whether a given use is a "beneficial
use" depends upon the precise circumstances of the case.20 7 The flex-
ibility of the concept of beneficial use in Oklahoma, however, does not
permit a court to declare that a particular use is not a beneficial use
because of the circumstances if the use is one specified in the statutory
declaration of policy. 08 Thus, it would be inappropriate for the
Oklahoma Water Resources Board to deny a permit for irrigation pur-
poses in an area which is short of water on the grounds that insufficient
water made irrigation a nonbeneficial use.20 9 On the other hand, it
might not be inappropriate for the Board to deny a permit for irrigation
203. Telephone conversation with J.A. Wood, March 28, 1979.
204. OKLA. Op. AT'Y GEN. 218 (1974).
205. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.2, 1020.9, 1020.15 (Supp. 1978).
206. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 1020.9, 1020.11(B) (Supp. 1978).
207. Tulare Irrigation Dist. v. Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation Dist., 3 Cal. 2d 489, 45 P.2d 972
(1935).
208. Hodges v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 580 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1978). Cf Hodges v.
Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 48 OKLA. B.A.J. 31 (1976) (opinion withdrawn, 49 OKLA. B.A.J.
1201 (1978)).
209. Hodges v. Oklahoma Water Resources Bd., 580 P.2d 980 (Okla. 1978).
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on those grounds if the method of irrigation proposed was wasteful.210
This leaves unresolved one significant problem. Suppose that
under the minimum basin life assumption permitted by the statute the
maximum annual yield is insufficient to provide an allocation of water
in an economically useable quantity for the needs for which it is de-
manded. The Board has attempted to deal with this problem in Till-
man County by estimating the probable number of acres for which
demands for new water rights will be made during the basin life and by
calculating the per acre share on that basis. In this way, the Board was
able to establish a per acre share of one acre-foot per year.21'
The problem with the Board's solution is that it is in direct conflict
with what the statute provides. The statute provides that the base upon
which a given applicant's proportionate share is determined is "the
land overlying the fresh ground water basin or sub-basin .... 212
Thus, if the statute is given a strict construction, a farmer who com-
mences irrigation under the 1972 Act may be able to irrigate only a
portion of the land which overlies the ground water basin and which
provides the basis for a calculation of his share of the water.2" 3 The
Board cannot recalculate the maximum annual yield on the basis of a
shorter basin life because the calculation is already based on the mini-
mum basin life permitted by statute. Even if such a recalculation could
be made, it would undesirable to do so because the costs of developing
the water could not reasonably be amortized in a shorter time frame.
Moreover, it may be impossible for farmers to obtain long term land
financing where irrigation water is likely to become unavailable before
210. See id Even the Tulare opinion may be construed as giving only a limited degree of
flexibility to the beneficial use concept. In Tulare, the court stopped far short of holding that an
agricultural use of water was not a beneficial use. Rather, the court held that such wasteful prac-
tices as using the entire flow of a stream for sub-irrigation and use of water to drown field pests
were not beneficial in the circumstances of the case.
Even if beneficial use is not available to limit the kind of use which might be made of water
in a water short area, the Board may nevertheless justify denial of permit on the ground that a
particular proposed use is not a natural use of the land to which the water is to be applied and thus
that the applicant has no water right to make such a use. See note 86 supra and accompanying
text.
211. Telephone conversation with J.A. Wood, March 28, 1979. The Tillman County Order
contains a finding that the total land area overlying the basin is 189,760 acres. The order provides
a maximum annual yield of 70,000 acre feet and a proportionate share for each landowner of one
acre foot per acre. OKLAHOMA WATER RESOURCES BOARD, FINAL ORDER FOR DETERMINATION
OF THE MAXIMUM ANNUAL YIELD OF FRESH GROUND WATER FROM THE TILLMAN COUNTY,
OKLAHOMA, ALLUVIUM AND TERRACE BASIN (Dec. 12, 1978). If the maximum annual yield were
distributed evenly over the entire 189,760 acres, then the proportionate share would be only a little
more than 1/3 of an acre-foot per acre.
212. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978).
213. See note 211 supra.
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the expiration of the loan term. The only solutions for a farmer caught
in that kind of a dilemma are either to buy more land than he plans to
farm so that he can acquire water rights sufficient for the farm he in-
tends to operate or to acquire water rights allocated to other land.
It is not clear that the ground water law permits the outright sale
of water rights. The Act contains no express permission for transfer of
water rights apart from the land to which the water rights appertain.2t 4
Further, it can be argued that the statute governing the approval of an
application for a permit allows a permit to be granted only for uses
which the applicant himself intends to make on his overlying land.215
However, the statute does provide for unitization of land.21 6 Thus,
it may be possible for several landowners to agree to operate their lands
as a unit for water purposes and to allocate the water produced from
the unit to certain lands, while other lands are allowed to lie fallow.
The problem with this solution is that it is quite cumbersome.21 7
IV. CONCLUSION
Unless the administrative construction of the statute passes judi-
cial scrutiny,218 the last mentioned problem is the one upon which the
Ground Water Law of 1972 is going to founder. Any given water use
214. Cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.22-.23 (Supp. 1978) (surface water).
215. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.9 (Supp. 1978). On the other hand, the statute does not ex-
pressly require that the water be used on the land from which it is taken or which provides the
basis for the individual allocation. The only express statutory requirement is that the well must be
located on land which the applicant .owns or leases under a lease permitting the applicant to
withdraw water from the ground water basin beneath the land.
216. OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, § 1020.20 (Supp. 1978).
217. Another procedure provided for by statute which may have some potential for alleviating
the problem is the formation of an irrigation district with enlarged powers or the enlargement of
the powers of an existing irrigation district. With the consent of more than 50% of the landowners
who own more than 50% of the land area within an irrigation district, an irrigation district may
"develop comprehensive plans for efficient use of fresh groundwater and the control and preven-
tion of waste; . . . develop information and limitations on well sizes, withdrawal rates, well spac-
ing and basin and sub-basin determinations; . . . adopt district rules and regulations on the
foregoing and enforce the same .... providing the same are in conformity with and have been
approved by the Water Resources Board . . . " OKLA. STAT. tit. 82 § 277.22 (Supp. 1978). The
rule making power with respect to the comprehensive plans for efficient use of fresh groundwater
may give an irrigation district with these enlarged powers the authority to form what is in effect a
compulsory unit, allocating the unit's allocated water to those within the unit who need it.
There are two problems with this. First, use of the enlarged powers in this way would run up
against the constitutional objections identified for the prior appropriation system. See notes 125-
26 supra and accompanying text. Second, the requirement of majority approval has made it im-
possible to give enlarged powers to any irrigation district in the state of Oklahoma.
218. Even if the administrative construction passes muster under the statute, it is still subject
to the same constitutional infirmities which characterize the recognition of prior rights. See notes
125-26 supra and accompanying text.
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requires a certain threshold quantity without which the use is either
impossible or uneconomic. If the per acre allocation in a particular
area does not meet that threshold requirement, then either the use must
be abandoned or one of the cumbersome alternatives outlined above
must be pursued to its conclusion. The alternatives to abandoning the
use may themselves lead to its abandonment either because the expense
of pursuing the alternative is too great (as in the case of a farmer's
purchase of more land than he intends to farm) or because the objec-
tive pursued becomes unattainable due to the lack of cooperation
among the interested parties (as in the case of an attempt to establish a
unitization plan).
Instead of a choice between unsatisfactory alternatives, the law
should make it possible for one who wishes to use ground water to
acquire a protected right to use enough water to meet his threshold
requirement without making the effort so expensive as not to be worth-
while. Further, the success of the effort ought not to depend upon the
vicissitudes of the unrestrained human will of those who feel their
rights, no matter how abstract, have been invaded. The prior appropri-
ation system of the 1949 law was a step in that direction, and the 1972
law seems to be a step backwards. The Board's attempt to save the
1972 law seems destined for failure.2 19
The constitutional problems with the prior appropriation system
are primarily problems of compensation. Thus, it might be possible to
structure a prior appropriation ground water allocation system by pro-
viding a means whereby those landowners who felt that their rights had
been invaded could seek damages against a permit holder measured by
the devaluation of their land.22 The amount by which land without
water development on it would be devalued due to withdrawal of its
water allocation seems to turn on the availability of water in the area.
Consider, for example, land which is good farm land except for the
shortage of water. If the water conditions on the land are such that
production of water at full capacity would quickly exhaust the water
supply, then the amount by which the value of the land is increased by
the presence of the water cannot be very great. And yet, compensation
for that lost value would respond fully to the constitutional objections
raised by the transfer of water under one landowner's land to another
landowner through the medium of a water permit.
219. See note 212 supra and accompanying text.
220. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. § 82a-716 (1977).
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The problem with the Oklahoma ground water law as it is pres-
ently structured is that it elevates property interests to such a high level
that the practical value of those property interests in the more arid ar-
eas of the state is minimal, except for low-value uses such as domestic
uses. Ground water is a resource which can provide substantial eco-
nomic benefits. These benefits cannot be obtained, however, unless the
privilege of using the water is concentrated in few enough hands so that
the amount which each of the privileged users is entitled to use is ade-
quate to obtain the potential economic benefits available. The
Oklahoma Ground Water Law of 1972 does not respond to this very
practical need.
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